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ABSTRACT: Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be 
disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast be-
tween the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held 
to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive. 
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1. Introduction 
Clearly having in mind Gödel’s theorem about the existence of undecidable sentences 
in arithmetic, Wittgenstein writes:  
I imagine someone asking my advice; he says: “I have constructed a proposition (I will use ‘P’ to 
designate it) in Russell’s symbolism, and by means of certain definitions and transformations it 
can be so interpreted that it says: ‘P is not provable in Russell’s system’. Must I not say that this 
proposition on the one hand is true, and on the other hand is unprovable? For suppose it were 
false; then it is true that it is provable. And that surely cannot be! And if it is proved, then it is 
proved that it is not provable. Thus it can only be true, but unprovable.” (Wittgenstein , p. 50e). 
 Here Wittgenstein is considering a familiar argument that there are arithmetical 
truths that are unprovable. Call this argument “Argument A”. 
 To this argument Wittgenstein responds: 
Just as we ask: “‘provable’ in what system?”, so we must also ask: “‘true’ in what system?” ‘True 
in Russell’s system’ means, as was said: proved in Russell’s system; and ‘false in Russell’s system’ 
means: the opposite has been proved in Russell’s system. —Now what does your “suppose it is 
false” mean? In the Russell sense it means ‘suppose the opposite is proved in Russell’s system’; if that 
is your assumption, you will now presumably give up the interpretation that it is unprovable. And by 
‘this interpretation’ I understand the translation into this English sentence. —If you assume that 
the proposition is provable in Russell’s system, that means it is true in the Russell sense, and the in-
terpretation “P is not provable” again has to be given up. If you assume that the proposition is 
true in the Russell sense, the same thing follows. Further: if the proposition is supposed to be false 
in some other than the Russell sense, then it does not contradict this for it to be proved in Rus-
sell’s system. (What is called “losing” in chess may constitute winning in another game.) (Witt-
genstein, p. 51e) 
 Call this argument “Argument B”. Argument B is based on two claims: (i) proof in 
mathematics is a system-relative notion; (ii) truth in mathematics is a system-relative 
notion. 
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 The first claim does not appear to be controversial. For example, a classical Peano 
proof is based on the Peano axioms and classical logic. A non-classical Peano proof is 
based on the Peano axioms and non-classical logic. But Argument B also contains a 
premise saying that truth in mathematics is a system-relative notion.  
 A theory, which I shall call the provability theory, gets its inspiration from this 
premise. This theory holds that the right way to regard pure mathematics is as a disci-
pline that deals with no existent objects whatsoever, and which doesn’t intend to. 
Mathematics is precisely what it looks to be: a system of notation within which we ca-
rry out proofs. What gets established in establishing mathematical existence is just a 
certain type of mathematical sentence, and its truth is nothing more than its provabil-
ity. 
 The key point is that in mathematics proof establishes nothing beyond itself. 
 It is natural to see this as wrong, to see a proof as always showing that something 
is true, but not as itself making for the truth of what it shows to be true. The idea is 
that a proof can show some statement is true, but the statement is not true in virtue of 
its having a proof, but in virtue of things being as it says they are. 
 The provability theorist affirms that this holds only outside of pure mathematics. It 
is agreed that what ordinarily establishes a sentence is not what makes it true. What 
makes for the truth of a sentence like ‘There are whales’ is how the world is, not the 
sequence of sentences we set forth as establishing this sentence. But this familiar dis-
tinction lacks application within pure mathematics. Proof inside mathematics is com-
pletely different from proof outside mathematics. In the non-mathematical cases, 
proof establishes something more — truth. In mathematics, being true consists in hav-
ing a proof. 
 My understanding of Wittgenstein is that he is not pushing the provability theory. 
Rather, his purpose is to show that Argument A is not as persuasive as it appears be-
cause it presupposes that mathematical truth is a system independent notion. Argu-
ment B is intended by Wittgenstein to show that if this presupposition is rejected one 
does not end up with the conclusion that some mathematical truths are unprovable — 
the conclusion of argument A. Wittgenstein himself takes no position on whether 
mathematical truth is system independent or system relative. He certainly did not take 
himself to be refuting Gödel or any mathematical result.  
 This conclusion is reinforced by Juliet Floyd who compiles historical evidence that 
Wittgenstein understood and accepted the Gödel result. (Floyd, pp.281-286) 
2. Mark Steiner 
In a recent paper Mark Steiner contends that “It is a mathematical theorem (of set 
theory) that the Gödel sentence P is true in Tarski’s sense if and only if it is unprov-
able.” (Steiner, p.267) Steiner adds, “… Argument A is a mathematical theorem, it is 
clear that no refutation will be forthcoming, and in particular Wittgenstein’s response 
[Argument B] is ineffectual.” (Steiner, p.267) So, for Steiner, Wittgenstein was in fact 
challenging a mathematical result whether or not that was his intention. 
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 A point similar to this could be made about standard models for arithmetic and 
truth in such models. By a model for a language L I mean the usual sort of structure: a 
domain set D and a function v, standardly defined, assigning elements and sets of n-
tuples of elements of the domain set to expressions of L. 
 The common model theoretic account proceeds by describing a certain model 
(e.g., by saying that its domain set is to be the set of natural numbers, that v(‘0’) is to 
be zero, that v(‘s’) is to be the successor function, and so on) and then calling a model 
standard just in case it is isomorphic to the described model. Let K be the described 
model. We then have the following definition: 
Df Where L is the language of arithmetic and M is a model for L: M is standard 
if and only if M is isomorphic to K.  
On the account of truth in a standard model of arithmetic it is unproblematic that 
Gödel sentences are true in such a model and unprovable if arithmetic is consistent.  
 I shall defend Wittgenstein against Steiner’s criticism of him. 
3. Criticism of Steiner 
I agree with Juliet Floyd who writes, “[Wittgenstein] would have questioned whether 
Tarski’s model-theoretic account of truth definitions for formalized languages yields a 
philosophical account of our notion of mathematical truth (let alone truth in general).” 
(Floyd, p. 304)  
 Wittgenstein would never have denied that “the Gödel sentence P is true in Tar-
ski’s sense if and only if it is unprovable.” He would never have denied that P is true 
in a standard model of arithmetic if and only if it is unprovable. But is truth in Tarski’s 
sense or truth in a standard model of arithmetic mathematical truth simpliciter? 
 As I see matters, the point of Argument B is that unless you can justify a yes an-
swer to this question Argument A does nothing to show that there is a difference be-
tween mathematical truth and mathematical provability. 
4. Mathematical Truth and Model-Theoretic Truth 
In response to something like the criticism just made, Steiner writes, “… to make a 
sharp boundary (on Wittgenstein’s behalf) between ‘true’ and ‘Tarski true’, is to over-
look the organic relation between the two which is illuminated brightly by Gödel’s 
theorem. Namely, the mathematician who has proved Gödel’s theorem, and who 
wants to extend the ‘Russell notion’ of truth (truth as provability in Principia Mathe-
matica, or, as in our treatment, in PA) to cover the undecidable sentence P, has no 
choice whatever ⎯ he must adopt Tarski truth as the extension of ‘true’ in light of 
Gödel’s theorem!” (Steiner, p. 268) 
 Against this, I contend that a person who accepts the provability thesis need not 
reject the notion of truth in a model. Such a person rejects only the alleged link be-
tween arithmetical truth and truth in a model. 
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 But one might here ask: How could one admit truth in a model and not admit that 
truth is bivalent? (If mathematical truth is bivalent, then it follows directly from the 
Gödel result that mathematical truth does not coincide with mathematical provability.) 
 Here a certain picture forces itself upon us ⎯ the denotational picture of what truth 
consists in. We slide from truth to truth in a model, and mistake the former for the latter. 
 A reason can be given for this slide: After all, we are inclined to think, semantics 
pertains to truth, and truth in a model provides the framework of our semantics. 
 To resist this assimilation of concepts we must soberly concentrate on the concept 
truth in a model and rigorously focus on what kind of concept it is, on the work it gets 
done. Its task is semantical. It serves to define the logic of the language of arithmetic, 
not to establish the metaphysics of arithmetical truth. The semantical concept, strictly 
construed as such, is altogether neutral about the metaphysics of arithmetical truth. 
 My point of view can be expressed as follows: Model theory is a mathematical ex-
ercise. It is a part of, and thus is internal to, mathematics. Model theory speaks of sets, 
relations among sets and so forth in the usual way. Thus, no one who works within the 
discipline — including one who accepts the provability theory — need deny the con-
cepts of model theory, including the concept of truth in a model as constructed within 
mathematics. 
 Still, when we say in our model theory that in a model ‘2’ denotes 2 we seem to con-
nect up word and object. But in fact our assertion is on all fours with the assertion  
32 > 23. Once we see this clearly we will no longer be tempted to suppose that a con-
cept internal to mathematics and strictly mathematical in content — the concept of 
truth in a model — is itself a concept apt for illuminating the concept of arithmetical 
truth. For what reason do we have for supposing that the concept of arithmetic truth 
is a concept of mathematics? In fact, there is no reason. The concept mathematical truth 
is no more a concept of mathematics than is the concept of mathematical necessity. 
5. Bivalence 
The philosophical issue before us can also be put in terms of bivalence because it is an 
obvious result of the Gödel result that there are unprovable truths if arithmetic is 
bivalent.  
 To bring the general situation into perspective, compare the following two phi-
losophers. The first is a pre-Gödelian philosopher who believes that each arithmetic 
proposition is true or false in virtue of how things stand with mathematical objects. In 
addition, she believes that each arithmetical truth has a proof within some single sys-
tem of proof. 
 The second is a pre-Gödelian philosopher who does not believe there are any 
mathematical objects. He reasons thus: Since there are no mathematical objects in vir-
tue of which arithmetical propositions are truth-valued, there cannot be anything 
more to arithmetic truth than provability. He too will believe that each arithmetic 
truth has a proof within some single system of proof. 
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 Both philosophers accept the thesis that, for any mathematical proposition φ, φ is 
an arithmetical truth if and only if φ is provable. But they accept this in different ways. 
For the first philosopher arithmetical truth coincides with provability. But it is a mathe-
matical reality that makes for arithmetical truth. For the second philosopher there is 
no such reality. Arithmetical truth consists in provability. 
 When the Gödel result becomes known these philosophers draw different morals. 
The first concludes that the provability thesis is untenable and asserts, what now 
seems obvious, that arithmetic truth is not axiomatizable. The second does not con-
clude this. The Gödel result does not convince him that there is some mathematical 
reality that fixes a truth-value for each arithmetical sentence and so he remains wed-
ded to the provability theory and concludes that there is no system of proof relative to 
which each arithmetic proposition is truth-valued. He then draws the moral that 
arithmetic is not bivalent. 
 For the philosopher of the first sort the primary conviction is that each sentence of 
arithmetic is truth-valued. And so long as it goes without question that arithmetical 
truth coincides with provability, the provability thesis will seem to her to provide a 
way of construing truth and falsity for arithmetic that avoids realism about mathe-
matical objects. For such a philosopher the Gödel result can only show that arithmeti-
cal truth does not coincide with provability. 
 The philosopher of the second sort does not have it as a primary conviction that 
the sentences of arithmetic are one and all truth-valued. Rather, the starting point for 
such a philosopher is a distrust of mathematical realism. And, of course, the Gödel re-
sult is, on its own, quite incapable of convincing anyone that a realist view of mathemat-
ics is correct. On the other hand, the view that all the sentences of arithmetic are 
truth-valued seems to inexorably lead to mathematical realism granted the Gödel re-
sult. Thus the philosopher of the second sort concludes that the Gödel result shows 
that not all the sentences of arithmetic are truth-valued. 
 If this survey of the situation is accurate, then the dividing issue is not the signifi-
cance of the Gödel result — it says what it says — but the correctness of the assump-
tion that each arithmetical sentence is truth-valued. And the Gödel result cannot on its 
own decide that issue. 
6. Final Remarks 
Mathematical realism is characteristically connected with a conception of mathemati-
cal meanings on which it is possible for us to associate such meanings with sentences 
without thereby providing methods sufficient for justifying their acceptance or rejec-
tion. This conception typically thinks of mathematical meanings in terms of truth-
conditions, so that what is possible for us to do is to associate truth-conditions with 
mathematical sentences without thereby providing methods for deciding those truth-
values. Opposed to realism is the provability view. On this view we endow our sen-
tences with mathematical meanings not by systematically associating them with truth-
conditions of a certain sort, but by providing methods of justification for the language 
 
Charles SAYWARD 352 
of mathematics. Mathematics itself says nothing about which of these two we ought 
to accept or whether we should accept either one. Nor did Wittgenstein.1
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